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RACISM IS IN THE AIR: THE FCC's MANDATE TO PROTECT
MINORITIES FROM GETTING SHORTCHANGED
BY ADVERTISERS
Robert Millar
Racist! It is a dirty word. But over the last year
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
or "the Commission") has characterized the buy-
ing practices of radio advertisers in the United
States as racist and racially discriminatory.' The
Commission's accusations are based on findings
of a survey released in 1999 that indicate minority-
formatted radio broadcast stations earn an aver-
age of 63% less than other stations with compara-
ble market shares.2 FCC Chairman William Ken-
nard has encouraged the advertising industry to
work to eliminate advertising discrimination.3
However, the industry has made very little pro-
gress and continues these discriminatory advertis-
ing practices.
I See American Advertising Federation Responds to FCC Study
Into Advertising and Minority Media Buying Practices (Jan. 13,
1999) <www.fcc.gov/speeches/kennard/statements> (ap-
plauding efforts of the American Advertising Federation
("AAF") -in developing a Blue Ribbon Task Force to reduce
current discriminatory practices in the advertising market);
William E. Kennard, Selling Advertisers on Serving All Americans,
Remarks Before the AAF (Feb. 22, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/
speeches/kennard> (suggesting that discriminatory advertis-
ing practices are harmful to the entire broadcast community
and that the advertising community should work toward a so-
lution); William E. Kennard, Address at the AAF News Con-
ference (Apr. 21, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/speeches/kennard/
statements> (applauding the efforts of the True North in
combating current advertising discrimination); FCC Chair-
man Kennard Details Three Part Strategy to Narrow the Digital Di-
vide Between Information Haves and Have-Nots (July 28, 1999)
<www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/NewsReleases/
1999/nrmc9O55.t> (suggesting that one of three issues that
must be solved in order to reduce the "digital divide" is the
practice of advertising discrimination) [hereinafter Kennard's
Strategy to Narrow Digital Divide]. See also Susan Ness, Speaking
Clearly and Succinctly, Remarks Before the AAF National Gov-
ernmental Affairs Conference (Mar. 25, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/
speeches/ness> (noting recent efforts of the AAF to change
traditional practices).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Discrimination
Consider, for example, WSKQ a Hispanic radio
station in New York City. In 1997, when the radio
station ranked fourth in terms of audience, it only
ranked thirteenth in ad revenue.4 In fact, WSKQ
held a 6.1 commercial audience share and earned
only $21.5 million in 1997. Two other general
market stations with commercial audience shares
of only 4.6 and 5.5 earned $34.8 million and $37.3
million, respectively. 5 In 1998, WSKQ tied WLTW
(Light/FM) for the number one rated station in
New York. On a national level, WSKQ's morning
radio show ranked second only to Howard Stern
in 1998.6 Yet, the station still had to work to con-
vince advertisers of their audience's value as con-
sumers.7 WSKQ Station Manager Luis Alvarez at-
2 See Kofi Asiedu Ofori, When Being No. 1 Is Not Enough:
The Impact of Advertising Practices On Minority-Owned & Minor-
ity-Formatted Broadcast Stations, at iii (Jan. 1999) <www.fcc.gov/
bureaus/massmedia/informal/ad-study/adsynopsis.html>
[hereinafter The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study]. The
generalizations or conclusions made with regard to television
advertising were inclusive due to the nature of the material.
Television programming is not targeted to such a narrow
demographic audience as radio broadcast is. However, the
study suggested that the Commission conduct further, more
extensive research in this area. See id. at ii.
3 See American Advertising Federation Responds to FCC Study
Into Advertising and Minority Media Buying Practices (jan. 13,
1999) <www.fcc.gov/speeches/kennard/statements>; Wil-
liam E. Kennard, Selling Advertisers on Serving All Americans,
Remarks Before the AAF (Feb. 22, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/
speeches/kennard> William E. Kennard, Address at the AAF
News Conference (Apr. 21, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/speeches/
kennard/statements>; Kennards Strategy to Narrow Digital Di-
vide, supra note 1.
4 See Quincy McCoy, Urban Myths . . . and The Truth,
GAVIN, Sept. 18, 1998, at 13 [hereinafter McCoy].
5 See The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, supra note 2,
at 35.
6 See McCoy, supra note 4, at 13.
7 See id. (indicating that although ad revenues had in-
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tributes this disparity directly to the fact that his
station has a Hispanic audience. One advertiser
for Ivory Soap refused to purchase time on that
station. The advertiser claimed that "Hispanics
don't bathe as frequently as non-Hispanics."8 This
discriminatory advertising practice is commonly
referred to as a "no Spanish dictate."9'
The FCC has reviewed discriminatory practices
on more than one occasion in the past.10 The
most recent study conducted by the Commission,
called the Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, was
the result of heightened interest in the issue. The
Commission chartered the study, which was con-
ducted by the Civil Rights Forum on Communica-
tions Policy, 1 shortly after a particularly embar-
rassing incident of advertising discrimination
became public.
The incident that precipitated the study was a
memo that has become known as the "Katz
Memo," which was issued in April of 1998 by a
reputable media representative firm, the Katz Me-
dia Group. 12The firm gained a great deal of nega-
tive publicity for circulating a memo to its sales
creased over the previous five years, it was a constant battle to
convince advertisers that their audience was a valuable com-
modity. Just five years prior, Macy's refused to purchase time
on the station because "it would increase shoplifting.").
8 Minority Radio Still Fighting Advertiser Discrimination, THE
FORUM CONNECTION, at 3 (Sept. 30, 1999) <www.civilrightsfo-
rum.org/connect990930.html>.
9 "No Urban/Spanish dictates" are practices whereby ad-
vertisers prohibit ad placement on stations with urban or
Spanish format. "Urban" is industry jargon for a format
aimed at black audiences. See The Minority Broadcast Advertis-
ing Study, supra note 2, at ii, 28. There is an additional prob-
lem in the industry known as "minority discounting." Minor-
ity discounting is a method of price discrimination where
advertisers refuse to pay minority-formatted stations the same
rate they would otherwise pay to a general market-formatted
station with comparable audience size. See id.; see also C. Ed-
win Baker, Giving The Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO STr. L.
J. 311, 318 (1997). The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study
shows that 75% of all stations owned by minorities are classi-
fied as minority format. Only 8% of stations owned by major-
ity group members are classified as minority format. Where
minorities own 116 stations, majority owners control 267 mi-
nority-formatted stations. But because of the greater ten-
dency of minority owners to serve the minority community,
practices such as "no Urban/Spanish dictates" and "minority
discounts" have a disproportionate effect on minority broad-
casters as well as minority-formatted stations. See The Minority
Broadcast Advertising Study, supra note 2, at 22-23.
10 See In Re Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule and Poli-
cies, Vacating the EEO Forfeiture Policy Statement and
Amending Section 1.80 of the Commission's Rules To In-
clude EEO Forfeiture Guidelines, Order and Policy Statement,
13 FCC Rcd. 6322 (1998); In Re Streamlining Broadcast EEO
Rule and Policies, Vacating the EEO Forfeiture Policy State-
ment and Amending Section 1.80 of the Commission's Rules
staff that advised against running ads on urban-
formatted stations because businesses "want pros-
pects, not suspects."' 3 Although the Katz Media
Group later apologized for the incident and
vowed to ensure a more sensitive, diverse staff, the
incident inflamed minority broadcast stations
across the nation. Since this incident, there have
been numerous public responses designed to
raise national awareness of advertising discrimina-
tion. Civil rights leader Al Sharpton staged a pro-
test at an advertising headquarters located on
New York's Madison Avenue and has since met
with the major producers to implement advertis-
ing practice changes.1 4 Radio personality Tom
Joyner has used his morning show as an opportu-
nity to air complaints of specific problems faced
by minority media.' 5
Also, following the Katz Memo and the FCC-
chartered study, Vice President Al Gore an-
nounced the formation of a federal interagency
working group to examine current advertising
practices and their effect on minority media out-
To Include EEO Forfeiture Guidelines, Order and Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 5154 (1996); Statement of Policy
on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979 (1978); In Re Petition for Rulemaking to Re-
quest Licensees to Show Non-discrimination in Their Em-
ployment Practices, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968).
1 n See The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, supra note
2, at ii.
12 See Mira Schwirtz, Ratings Racism: When No. 1 Is Not,
MEDIA WEEK, June 22, 1998, at 14; see also Minority Radio Still
Fighting Advertiser Discrimination, The Forum Connection
(Sept. 30, 1999) <www.civilrightsforum.org/connect990930.
html> [hereinafter Minority Radio Still Fighting]. A "represen-
tative firm" or "rep. firm" represents broadcasters and solicits
advertising business on their behalf. Similar to advertising
firms who seek broadcasters, these rep. firms seek advertisers
on behalf of the broadcasters.
13 Minority Radio Still Fighting, supra note 12.
14 See Stuart Elliott, Advertising: Al Sharpton meets Madison
Ave. and Both See Progress in Multicultural Marketing Efforts, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999; see also George Curry, Campaign for Re-
spect: Rev. Al Sharpton's National Action Network Is Targeting
Larger Shares of Madison Avenue's Ad Dollars For Minority Mar-
kets, EMERGE, May 1999, at 35 (reporting Sharpton's cam-
paign to fight advertising discrimination).
15 On one specific occasion, radio personality Tom
Joyner, host of the nationally syndicated "The Tom Joyner
Morning Show," aired a request that African American listen-
ers mail to him receipts for purchases they have made at
CompUSA. He alleged that CompUSA buys virtually no ad-
vertising time on black media although their customer base
consists of an enormous minority population. His intent was
to mail the boxes of receipts to CompUSA to impress upon
them the enormity of their customers who are black. See Mi-
nority Radio Still Fighting, supra note 12.
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lets.16 The interagency working group is an infor-
mal organization composed of representatives
from the FCC, the Federal Trade Commission,
the Department of Commerce, Congress and the
Office of the Vice President (The Office of
Reinventing Government). a7 The primary direc-
tive of the interagency working group is to part-
ner with industry to develop an awareness of ad-
vertising discrimination and develop industry
solutions. Rather than promoting federal regula-
tion, they seek to promote "best industry prac-
tices."18 So far the working group has made no
public findings.
B. Industry Response
At a conference hosted by the American Adver-
tising Federation ("AAF") in response to the prob-
lem of advertising discrimination, Chairman Ken-
nard proposed that industry develop a solution on
its own.1 9 He challenged the advertisers, advertis-
ers' agencies and media representatives to con-
sider adopting a simple code of nondiscrimina-
tion and implement it within the industry.20
Since the FCC study and the Katz memo, the
broadcast industry has a heightened awareness of
racial discrimination in the marketplace, and
many broadcasters have made efforts to promote
diversity in broadcast media, acting simply on
their distaste for the present situation. The FCC
recently reported that many broadcasters, al-
though no longer required to do so by law, con-
tinue to abide by equal employment opportunity
16 See Stuart Elliott, White House Pushes Business for Minor-
ity-Owned Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at C8 (focusing
on the affects of advertising practices on both ad agencies
and media outlets; Gore's comments were made to an AAF
meeting).
17 See id. Note that a "working group" is an informal or-
ganization, not bound by the same regulatory burdens of a
formal executive "task force." Although the original working
group also consisted of members from the Small Business Ad-
ministration and the Department of Justice, those organiza-
tions no longer participate. In addition to official members,
the AAF has worked in a coordinated effort to support the
efforts of the working group and provides a representative to
all working group meetings.
18 Id.
19 See William E. Kennard, Selling Advertisers on Serving All
Americans, Remarks Before the AAF (Feb. 22, 1999) <www.fcc.
gov/speeches/kennard/spwek908.htm>.
20 See id. Kennard encouraged attendees at the confer-
ence to consider the following three principles when devel-
oping a voluntary code of industry conduct: "[u]se accurate
information about consumer purchasing practices to ensure
principles.21
A significant step was taken more recently when
a group of leading broadcasters announced the
formation of an investment fund designed to spur
ownership of television and radio stations by mi-
norities and women. 22 This fund, known as the
"Prism Fund," was announced by the President of
CBS and the Chairman of Clear Channel Commu-
nications, who said that they intended to demon-
strate that the private sector can sometimes act to
address public issues more effectively than the
government.23 With an initial investment of $175
million, this initiative shows enormous commit-
ment on the part of broadcasters to address the
problem. 24
A few advertisers also are recognizing the enor-
mous market potential available to them through
minority markets. Wal-Mart, one of the largest re-
tail chains in the United States, has targeted His-
panic audiences through Hispanic formatted me-
dia. Last year, Wal-Mart doubled the amount of
money spent on targeted minority consumers and
spent nearly half its advertising budget on minor-
ity media.25 Although a tremendous step to pro-
moting diversity within the broadcast market, the
Prism Fund is not accomplishing the same results
as Wal-Mart. The Prism Fund is simply not ad-
dressing the discrimination that minority broad-
casters face once they enter the marketplace.
Rather, it is only aimed at establishing greater mi-
nority ownership in the industry. Without address-
ing the issue of advertising discrimination, the
fair access to information, promote fair competition [a]nd
expand opportunity for all Americans." Id.
21 See Public Interest Obligations of Television Broadcast
Licenses, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 4211,
4215, para. 30 (2000).
22 See Broadcasting Industry Announces Minority Investment
Fund; Fund's Ultimate Goal Is $1 Billion In Purchase Power To
Help Increase Minority Ownership of Media Properties (Nov. 3,
1999) <www.nab.org/pressrel/releases/5899.asp> (announc-
ing the commitment of funds by numerous broadcasters).
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See John Consoli & Katy Bachman, Ethnic Expansion;
AAF, True North Create New Minority Unit, MEDIAWEEK, Apr.
26, 1999, at 4 (stating that since February 1998, the retailer
had spent $1 million to $2 million on Radio Unica, a His-
panic radio network). The editors of MEDIAWEEK estimate
that this number is half of Wal-Mart's total radio budget. See
id. This is only one example of industry recognizing the value
of minority markets and utilizing minority media to reach
those markets.
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Prism Fund is setting up minority broadcasters for
failure.
It would seem that the above industry examples
are a sign of change within the broadcast industry.
The discrimination problem, however, is not be-
ing solved. Wal-Mart, an exception in the indus-
try, was previously an industry leader with regard
to utilizing minority media.2 6 Even before the
Katz Memo was publicized, nearly one quarter of
Wal-Mart's annual marketing budget was spent on
Hispanic radio.27
Searching for solutions, one organization, a
joint federal working group, has the goal of high-
lighting industry "best practices" in an attempt to
highlight models the rest of the industry should
follow. Their goal is to avoid federal regulation.
But federal regulation/government intervention
is sometimes necessary to stop discrimination;
though somewhat costly to society at large, gov-
ernment intervention has proven an appropriate
resolution to discrimination.2 8
Federal action must be taken to prevent this
type of advertising discrimination.29 If there is no
regulatory restriction regarding these advertising
practices, advertisers will continue to conduct bus-
iness as usual. The FCC has a congressional man-
date to promote diverse views on the airwaves.3 °
This congressional mandate gives the FCC author-
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Andrew 1. Batavia, The Americans With Disabilities
Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege: Ideology and Independent
Living: Will Conservatism Harm People with Disabilities? 549 AN-
NALS 10 (1997) (arguing government intervention is neces-
sary to prevent discrimination of disabled persons and noting
that the argument centers arotnd the premise that you have
a small group being dominated by a large force); Thomas 0.
McGarity, The Administrative State at a Crossroads: The APA at
Fifty: The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatoy State,
63 U. Cm. L. REV. 1463 (1996) (stating that one cannot al-
ways depend on the free market because "consumers or
workers may have insufficient information to make rational
choices; companies may impose uncompensated costs or
risks (externalities or spillovers) on other private parties; or
transaction costs, free riders or holdouts may render private
bargains infeasible"); Laura G. Dooley & Robert S. Gaston,
Stumbling Toward Equity: The Role of Government In Kidney
Transplantation, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 703 (arguing that gov-
ernment intervention is necessary in kidney transplants to
protect the public good and prevent historic racial discrimi-
nation of black kidney transplant patients) (1998); and
DAVID L. KIRP, MARK G. YUDOF & MARLENE S. FRANKS, GENDER
JUSTICE 137 (1987) (suggesting that government intervention
is necessary to prevent sexual discrimination).
29 See generally The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study,
supra note 2 (suggesting that the FCC take the lead in con-
ducting more intense studies and developing a resolution).
ity to take action to diminish the inequity of mi-
nority discounts. The following note will: I) define
discriminatory advertising practices; II) state the
Commission's authority to act on this type of dis-
criminatory practice; III) discuss why the appro-
priate response is government intervention; and
IV) propose specific actions that the Commission
should take to prevent advertising discrimination.
II. ADVERTISING DISCRIMINATION
The decision to purchase "air time" from
broadcasters involves developing a detailed mar-
keting plan to identify target consumers. By devel-
oping specific media objectives, advertisers are
better able to market their products effectively.
Typically, advertisers identify the target in terms
of a demographic description 3' (e.g. females, ages
25-45, with household incomes above $40,000).
Airtime is purchased from media outlets patron-
ized by the target groups most likely to consume
the advertisers' products.3 2
The process of selecting an advertising venue
involves evaluating a number of factors. 33 A num-
ber of criteria affect this decision-making process
and may account for the no Urban/Spanish dic-
tates and minority discounts. 34 The Minority Broad-
cast Advertising Study indicated that certain indus-
30 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1999). Section 151 describes the
purpose of chapter 5, regulating wire or radio communica-
tion, and also creates the FCC. It states:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio.., to all
the people of the United States, without discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex, a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service with adequate facili-
ties at reasonable charges, for the purpose of national
defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and
property through the use of wire and radio communica-
tion, and for the purpose of securing a more effective
execution of this policy by centralizing authority hereto-
fore granted by law.
id.
31 See The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, supra note
2, at 25.
32 See id.
31, See id. (referring the reader to "Overview of Media
Planning" at Diagram A, app. A). The overview breaks down
the media planning process into the following six steps: 1)
marketing objectives; 2) marketing strategies; 3) media
objectives; 4) media strategies; 5) decisions implementing
strategies (tactics); and 6) media buying. These six steps,
Ofori suggests, are the process by which advertisers select a
media to reach their target consumer. See id.
34 See id. at 26-27. In the survey, The Civil Rights Forum
found multiple, potential influences on the decision-making
[Vol. 8
Protecting Minority Broadcasters
try misconceptions are based, at least in part, on
racial/ethnic stereotypes. 35
In 1997, the New York Volvo dealers association
adopted the following demographic profile for a
media-buying campaign: education must be col-
lege graduate or higher; annual household in-
come of $75,000; age range of 25-54.36 Without
stipulating race, the income and education
demographics implicitly circumvented radio sta-
tions that serve primarily Black and Hispanic con-
sumers in New York.3 7 In an attempt to win the
Volvo account, Emmis Broadcasting 3 ("Emmis")
conducted specific market research.3 9 Emmis
found little correlation between Volvo's demo-
graphic profile and the vast majority of Volvo
owners. In fact, the qualitative data employed by
Emmis proved that 80% of the Volvo owners in
New York City did not fit Volvo's profile. 40 Nearly
29% were not between the ages of 25 to 54; more
than 60% had incomes less than $75,000; and al-
most 65% had not graduated from college. 4' Af-
ter presenting specific market information to the
advertisers that indicated urban listeners spent
similar amounts on new cars as the audiences of
general-format radio stations, the advertiser still
decided not to buy from WRKS on grounds inde-
pendent from the market research. 42
The above issue regarding Volvo advertising is
an example of "no Urban dictates." These "no Ur-
ban/Spanish dictates" and minority discounts
cause minority-formatted radio stations to suffer
financially from their inability to convince adver-
processes:
[R]acial/ethnic minority consumers are incorrectly ster-
eotyped as inappropriate for certain luxury products or
services; stations that program to minority listeners are
excluded based on average listener income, regardless
of data about consumption patterns; the desire to disas-
sociate a company's image from minority consumers;
language barriers, in the case of Hispanic radio; un-
founded fears that minority consumers pilfer; media
buyers' unfamiliarity with the consumer habits of minor-
ities; efforts by broadcasters and/or their national sales
representatives to discourage advertisements on minor-
ity-formatted station; the belief that minorities can be
reached through the general media.
Id.
35 The findings of this study were based on a survey of
broadcasters and advertisers in the Washington D.C. area,
the eighth largest market. It was clearly noted in their find-
ings that when surveying advertisers, responsiveness to ads on
urban and Spanish stations was not given as a reason for not
purchasing media time from those stations. See id. at 5,
36-43.
36 See id. at 25.
37 See id.
tisers of the viability of the minority consumer
market. Although it is unfortunate that minority
broadcasters suffer from these practices, one
might ask, "What is wrong with advertisers dis-
criminating against certain market groups if there
are differences between certain demographic
groups? What is wrong with businesses deciding
where their advertising dollars are best spent? Is
that really discriminatory?"
The difference between discriminating against
certain demographic groups and choosing where
one's advertising dollars are best spent is that one
practice may be racial discrimination and the
other smart business. Intervention is necessary to
prevent racial discrimination being perpetuated
by market forces.43 A vibrant democracy is based
on the equal opportunity for all voices to be
heard. American radio airwaves are a public re-
source that should not be governed by racially
motivated advertising dollars. Rather, radio air-
waves should be protected for the use by all Amer-
ican voices. Business decisions should be based on
statistical data devoid of racial bigotry.
III. THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY
The Commission's authority to prevent discrim-
ination is present on two fronts: their congres-
sional mandate to promote diversity and their
ability to consider anti-competitive activities when
licensing broadcasters.
38 Emmis Broadcasting is the owner of a popular black-
formatted radio station in New York. See id.
39 See id.
40 The data used by Emmis was gathered by Scarborough
Reports, a division of the Arbitron Co. that conducts broad-
cast market research. This information was provided to the
Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy by Judith Ellis,
Senior Vice President of Emmis Radio and General Manager
of WRKS-FM. See id. at 25 n.61.
41 See id. at 25.
42 See id. at 26. The station manager reported:
We went to the buying service. They gave us a lot of
time. We got to see people right up the line; the account
people. They couldn't say no. It was right there in black
[and] white; we were showing them. And then it got
down to-what we were told by the buying service-was
the head of the dealership who said, 'I just don't want
to. We just don't want it on that radio station.' . . . I
don't believe the criteria ever really mattered to begin
with. I think to a great degree the criteria exist so that
they can eliminate whoever they want to eliminate, i.e.
the Black station. And they buy whoever they want.
Id.
4-1 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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A. Congressional Mandate to Promote Diversity
Nearly 95% of Americans listen to radio each
day, an average of more than 20 hours a week.44
Due to their use of public airwaves and the signifi-
cant impact they have on society, broadcasters
have a special role in serving the public. For more
than seventy years, broadcasters have been re-
quired by the Commission to serve the "public in-
terest, convenience and necessity." 45 The basis of
the Commission's authority lies in its own man-
date to provide for the "public convenience, inter-
est or necessity."4 1 This section of the Communi-
cations Act of 193447 ("Communications Act")
thus provided the FCC with the broad responsibil-
ity of implementing the public interest require-
ment.48 Without question, this public interest re-
quirement is the "touchstone" of the
Commission's statutory role in granting broadcast
licenses. 49 Under the Communications Act, as
amended, the FCC may issue, renew or approve
the transfer of a broadcast license only upon first
finding that doing so will serve the public inter-
est.5 o
Presently, broadcasters must comply with nu-
merous affirmative public interest requirements.
Broadcast licensees are required to cover issues
facing their communities; comply with statutory
44 See William E. Kennard, Address to the National Associa-
tion of Broadcast Radio Convention (Oct. 16, 1998) <www.fcc.
gov/speeches/kennard/spwek852.html>.
45 New York Central Securities Corp. v. U.S., 287 U.S. 12,
25 (1932) (affirming the FCC's criterion that broadcast li-
censing decisions be guided by the "public interest, conve-
nience or necessity."). Although this licensing standard
leaves room for wide discretion and does not lend itself to
application with "exactitude," it is considered as concrete as
complicated factors for judgment permit. See FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953), affg, New
York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12
(1932).
46 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1999).
47 Title I, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
48 See 47 U.S.C. § 303.
49 See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcasters,
supra note 21, at para. 1 (restating what the Commission
communicated). This role of the FCC has been upheld and
recognized by the following courts: FCC v. Pottsville Broad.
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC,
180 F.2d 28, 31 (1950); and Regents of N.M. College v. Albu-
querque Broad. Co., 158 F.2d 900, 906 (1947).
50 See 47 U.S.C § 303(1).
51 See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1999); see also Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the statutory au-
thority of the FCC to promulgate regulations requiring licen-
sees to offer reply time to individuals personally attacked dur-
ing presentation of views on public issues or to political
political broadcasting requirements regarding re-
buttal opportunities, 5' charges for political adver-
tising and reasonable access for federal candi-
dates; 52 and meet license obligations regarding
sponsorship identification 53 and equal employ-
ment opportunities..5 4 The Commission imposes
these requirements on broadcasters because of
the importance they hold in serving the public in-
terest. Moreover, the Commission finds that the
requirements serve to ensure the broadcaster is
serving that interest. This public interest concept
is based on the idea of spectrum scarcity. 55 Spec-
trum scarcity necessitates that only a limited num-
ber of individuals may use the airwaves for radio
broadcast. Because of this limit on an important
natural resource, Congress has authorized the
Commission to license broadcasters to use por-
tions of the airwaves generally to serve the "public
interest, convenience and necessity."56
The Telecommunications Act of 199657 (the
"Act" or "1996 Act"), promotes a public policy of
diversity in the media through this broad "public
interest, convenience and necessity" mandate. 58
Although diversity is not specifically defined as a
goal of the Act, numerous sections indicate strong
congressional intent for the maintenance of diver-
sity by the Commission. 59 Complying with this
opponents of those candidates for public office who were en-
dorsed in a broadcast).
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 315.
53 See 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (1999).
54 See In Re Review of Commission's Broadcast and Cable
Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies and Ter-
mination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, Report and Or-
der, MM Dkt. Nos. 98-204, 96-16, FCC 00-20 (rel. Feb. 10,
2000) [hereinafter EEO Order].
55 See National Broad. Co v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943i
(introducing the concept of spectrum scarcity); Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 392 (discussing spectrum scarcity as a problem unique
to broadcasting).
56 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1999).
57 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
58 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1999).
59 See id. at § 303(f), (g), (r) (authorizing the Commis-
sion to license and regulate use of the radio spectrum "as
public convenience, interest or necessity requires," to "gener-
ally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in
the public interest and to enact regulations to carry out the
provisions of the Act"). The Supreme Court has held that
§ 303(r) confers authority on the Commission to issue regu-
lations codifying its view of the public interest licensing stan-
dard so long as that view is based on consideration of permis-
sible factors and is otherwise considered reasonable. See FCC
v. National Citizens Committee for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793
(1978). Section 307 directs the Commission to grant and re-
new broadcast licenses "if public convenience, interest or ne-
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mandate, the Commission has wide discretion in
determining questions both of public policy and
of procedural policy in making and applying ap-
propriate rules.60 Although this discretion is
somewhat vague, it has been recognized by courts
as a basis for the theory that diversification in
mass media serves the public interest by promot-
ing diverse programming.61
Moreover, Section 151 was amended by the Act
to make the Commission's mandate clear that it is
to regulate interstate and foreign communica-
tions services so that they are "available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States,
without discrimination on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, national origin, or sex."' 62 Section 151 thus gives
the Commission the right to enforce other provi-
sions of the Act under the guidance that the pro-
visions should not negatively impact diverse popu-
lations.6 3 This recent amendment, which applies
to all entities subject to the Communications
Act,6 4 amplifies the Commission's general public
interest mandate to ensure that broadcasting and
other programming services serve the needs and
interests of all sectors of the community. This also
indicates more specifically that such services shall
be provided to all Americans without discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or any other classifica-
tion. In light of this mandate, the Commission has
sought to ensure that licensing of broadcast sta-
tions is available to all persons, without regard to
sex, race, national origin or religion.
The FCC has significant authority to ensure
broadcast diversity under Section 309 of the Act,
which covers the Commission's duty to grant li-
censes. Section 309 gives the Commission the abil-
ity to give preferences to applicants where the
cessity will be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). The Com-
mission is directed by § 309 to determine whether the
"public interest, convenience and necessity will be served" by
the grant of license applications, renewals and modifications.
Id. at § 309(a). Section 310(d) imposes the same standards
on transfer applications. See id. at § 310(d).
60 See Ward v. FCC, 108 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
61 See National Citizens Committee for Broad., 436 U.S. at
780. The public interest requirement has also been detailed
by the Commission. See generally EEO Order, supra note 54, at
22, para. 48; In Re Review of the Commission's Broadcast and
Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies
and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 23004, 23019-22, para.
41 (1999); In Re Review of the Commission's Regulations
Governing Television Broadcasting; Television Satellite Sta-
tions Review of Policy and Rules, Report and Order, 14 FCC
Rcd. 12903, 12904 (1999); In Re Implementation of Section
309 0) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, 11
granting of a license would result in media diversi-
fication.6 5 The 1996 Act also modified the Com-
mission's procedures for processing broadcast re-
newal applications and refined the standard to be
applied when determining whether to grant the
applications. 66 As amended, the Communications
Act directs the Commission to grant a license re-
newal application only if it finds, with respect to
the station at issue, that the licensee has served
the public interest requirement; the licensee has
not committed any serious violations of the Act or
FCC rules; and that the licensee has not commit-
ted a series of violations of the Act or rules that
constitute a pattern of abuse. 67 The 1996 amend-
ment thus clarifies that the public interest stan-
dard is broader in scope than compliance with
any specific provisions of the Act or the Commis-
sion's rules. The development of certain criteria
that would prohibit all broadcasters from engag-
ing in business with those who engage in discrimi-
natory advertising would promote diversity and
the public interest within the meaning of sections
151 and 309. Referring to the "public interest,
convenience and necessity" licensing standard,
the Commission stated in the recently released
EEO Order:
While we have grappled over the years with the task of
giving form and content to that statutory mandate, we
have no doubt that it requires us to deny licenses to
those who would discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity or gender. Such persons do not have the basic
character qualifications to hold a valuable government
license.
68
As this statement demonstrates, the Commis-
sion evaluates discriminatory practices seriously,
as well as character qualities of those licensees
who discriminate.
FCC Rcd. 19341, para. 31 (noting where public interest re-
quirements determined Commission decision-making in the
competitive bidding process).
62 47 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added).
63 See id.
64 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 143 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 155.
65 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (3) (A). ("The Commission shall
establish rules and procedures to ensure that ... significant
preferences will be granted to applicants or groups of appli-
cants, the grant to which of the license or permit would in-
crease the diversification of ownership of the media of mass
communications.").
66 See EEO Order, supra note 54, at para. 48 n.91 (review-
ing the Commission's Public Interest Mandate to Promote Pro-
gramming Diversity).
67 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k).
(68 See EbO Order, supra note 54, at para. 2.
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The Commission has the additional directive of
Section 257.69 This rule directs the Commission
to identify and eliminate market entry barriers
"for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in
the provision and ownership of telecommunica-
tions services. '70 Although this section was imple-
mented with the intent to promote opportunity
for entrepreneurs, minorities and other small bus-
iness owners entering the telecommunications
field,7' it once again shows congressional favor of
diverse participants in the communications mar-
ket. The section also states that in carrying out its
congressional mandate, the Commission should
seek to promote policies favoring "diversity of me-
dia voices" and "vigorous economic competi-
tion. '72 The practice of advertisers using un-
founded and frequently stereotypical generalities
as a basis for their marketing plan is an enormous
market barrier faced by minority-owned and
-formatted radio stations.
Although it might make sense for the FCC to
impose restrictions directly on the advertisers
themselves, the power of Commission regulation
is confined to those whom it licenses or declines
to license to broadcast. 73 The FCC has a signifi-
cant opportunity to promulgate a rule under its
statutory mandate of promoting and maintaining
diverse viewpoints in broadcasting.
Incumbent radio broadcasters wishing to main-
tain the status quo argue that this type of regula-
tion is an attempt to control the supply and de-
mand of the market.74 They argue that advertisers
69 47 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2000).
70 Id. at § 257(a), (b) (stating also that "the Commission
shall seek to promote the policies and purposes of this chap-
ter favoring diversity of media voices, vigorous economic
competition, technological advancement and promotion of
the public interest, convenience and necessity").
71 Congress appears to have mandated these market bar-
rier proceedings to support the Commission's promotion of
the diversity goals in the 1996 Act.
72 47 U.S.C. § 257(b).
73 Additionally, the FCC was determined to have the au-
thority to regulate those who provide facilities for broadcast-
ing. See generally Yankee Network, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212
(D.C. Cir. 1939).
74 See C. Edwin Baker, Giving The Audience What It Wants,
58 Omimo ST. L.J. 311, 387 (1997) [hereinafter Baker].
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1999); see also 47 U.S.C § 151. In
a regulated industry, anti-competitive behavior is contrary to
the public interest. See In Re Applications for Renewal of Li-
cense Filed by United Tel. Co. of Ohio for Radio Common
Carrier Stations KZA459 and KQA651 in the Domestic Public
Land Mobile Radio Service, Report and Order, 26 F.C.C.2d
place a certain value on advertising audiences
based on their potential consumer expectations. 75
These opponents would attribute the discounting
and other discriminatory advertising practices to a
market determination that the audiences of cer-
tain radio stations are not as valuable as other
audiences.7 6
B. Considering Anti-Competitive Practices
The Commission is permitted to take antitrust
policies into account when making licensing deci-
sions pursuant to the "public interest" require-
ments of the Act. 77 This concept of preventing
monopolistic powers is essential to promoting di-
versity in views and voices on the nations airwaves.
Discrimination becomes an anti-competitive
practice when a group with the power to reduce
competition from others can benefit itself,
whether race, gender, religion or industry defines
the group.78 Discriminatory social groups can be
similar to cartels; their actions, which have be-
come industry norms, are "analogous to a price-
fixing agreement. '79 Thus, the analysis of discrim-
inatory market power reflects aspects of monop-
oly theory and antitrust law.
U.S. antitrust legislation outlaws cartels and
other conspiracies against trade.80 The courts
have interpreted the law to prohibit certain collu-
sive practices, such as retail price maintenance,
through "per se prohibitions" of the actions, re-
gardless of whether collusion in fact occurred.8'
417, 419 (1970); see also National Citizens Committee for Broad.,
436 U.S. at 779 (affirming the Commissions disallowance of
common ownership of a radio or television broadcast station
and a daily newspaper located in the same community).
More generally, "[d]iversification of control of the media of
mass communications" has been viewed by the Commission
as "a factor of primary significance" in determining which
competitive applicants in a comparative proceeding should
receive the initial license for a particular broadcast facility.
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public
Notice, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-395 (1965).
78 See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 133, 153 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter].
70 Id.
80 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
"I See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 646 (1980); National Society of Professional Engi-
neers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). The
Supreme Court has stated:
[There] are certain agreements or practices which be-
cause of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
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These legal prohibitions greatly increase the diffi-
culty of sustaining a cartel. Similarly, U.S. civil
rights laws prohibit business practices involving
disparate treatment of those persons belonging to
protected classes under Title VII of the equal em-
ployment laws.8 2 The illegality of conducting cer-
tain business transactions with the intent to dis-
criminate greatly increases the difficulties
involved in explicit discrimination.
Anti-discrimination laws in some ways are very
similar to antitrust laws.83 Similar to anti-competi-
tive practices, the discrimination of advertisers has
an affect on minority-formatted broadcasters in
that it prevents them from prospering while their
counterparts with general format prosper.8 4 Their
histories are also similar. For example, in prose-
cuting unlawful discrimination, initially the gov-
ernment focused on explicit discriminatory prac-
tices;8 5 "the plaintiff had to prove the existence of
disparate treatment by the employer."' 6 The law
changed, however, in 1971 when the Supreme
Court developed the concept of "disparate im-
pact.' '8 7 Now a practice can have an illegal dispa-
rate impact in the absence of discriminatory in-
tent.88 The illegality of the outcome is identified
by a pattern suggesting that a protected group has
been unreasonably disadvantaged by a business
practice. Thus, disparate impact in anti-discrimi-
nation law bears a certain resemblance to "mo-
nopoly structure" in antitrust law where powerful
groups reduce competition.
Market barriers give the FCC authority to pre-
vent discriminatory advertising practices. As dis-
cussed, not only do these practices have disparate
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate in-
quiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the bus-
iness excuse for their use. This principle of per se unrea-
sonableness not only makes the type of restraints which
are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the ne-
cessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged eco-
nomic investigation . . . -an inquiry so often wholly
fruitless when undertaken. Among the practices which
the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in
and of themselves are price fixing.
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958).
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
83 See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory
Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 382
n.26 (1995). More broadly, Ayres suggests that antitrust law
could be used to attack discrimination as an "unfair or decep-
tive trade practice." Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817,
impact on market entry, they also significantly im-
pact the livelihood of the broadcaster and the di-
versity of the airwaves. Because of the existence of
these antitrust practices, the FCC has authority to
act on them.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Commission's
Authority
In applying this public interest standard, the
Commission has been granting licenses based in
part on their program proposals. In FRC v. Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.,89 the Court noted that
in "view of the limited number of available broad-
casting frequencies, the Congress has authorized
allocation and licenses." 90 In determining how
best to allocate frequencies, the Federal Radio
Commission considered the needs of competing
communities and the programs offered by com-
peting stations to meet those needs. Moreover, if
needs or programs shifted, the Commission could
alter its allocations to reflect those shifts. 9' In the
same vein, the Court in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast-
ing Co.92 noted that the statutory standard was a
flexible instrument to effect congressional desires
"to maintain ... a grip on the dynamic aspects of
radio transmission" and to allay fears that "in the
absence of governmental control the public inter-
est might be subordinated to monopolistic domi-
nation in the broadcasting field."93
In Associated Press v. United States,94 the Supreme
Court upheld a district court decision that
granted summary judgment to prevent members
of a press association from acting in restraint of
821 (1991) [hereinafter Ayres].
84 See Ayres, supra note 83, at 821.
85 See Cooter, supra note 78, at 155.
86 Id. (referring to anti-discrimination policy, its history
and regulations surrounding it).
87 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (hold-
ing that Title VII prohibits the use of tests which have a dispa-
rate impact, even if the employer has no intent to discrimi-
nate, unless the employer can demonstrate that the test is
substantially related to the job).
88 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding
that under the Constitution as opposed to Title VII, unlawful
discrimination requires proof of intentional discrimination
and not just disparate impact).
89 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
90 Id. at 279.
91 See id. at 285.
92 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
93 Id. at 137-138.
94 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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trade. 9 5 The Court stated that the First Amend-
ment was meant to promote the "widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources."9 6 The Court noted that it
would be strange to prevent the government from
imposing restraints on the dissemination of infor-
mation and "afford non-governmental combina-
tions a refuge if they impose restraints upon that
constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 9 7
In 1990, the Supreme Court again upheld a
public policy of maintaining diversity in broad-
casting. The Court held in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FC0's that the FCC's policy of promoting mi-
nority interests was a valid means of promoting di-
verse broadcast and a valid exercise of FCC au-
thority.99 In addition, the Court held that policies
promoting program diversity were an important
governmental goal and that it had always been an
integral component of the Commission's mission
to safeguard that public right.")"
The Supreme Court later overruled their analy-
sis in Metro Broadcasting. In 1995, the Court held
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena"1' that minor-
ity preferences must be analyzed under a "strict
scrutiny" standard instead of the "intermediate
scrutiny" standard used in Metro Broadcasting.0 2
Adarand Constructors, a nonminority-owned busi-
ness, lost a U.S. Department of Transportation
bid on a highway construction project despite the
fact that it qualified for the work and submitted
the lowest bid.'0 3 The Court held, under its new
test, that all race-conscious measures must be nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental
interest.1 0 4
Additional court scrutiny came three years later
in Lutheran Church v. FCC'0 5 when the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied
95 See id. at 20.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
99 See id. at 566.
100 See id. at 554-556.
101 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
102 See id. at 227.
103 See id. at 205.
104 The opinion said:
[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by
what-ever ... government actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words,
such classifications are constitutional only if they are nar-
rowly tailored measures that further compelling govern-
ment interests. To the extent that Metro Broad. is incon-
sistent with that holding, it is over-ruled.
the Supreme Court's Adarand-based "strict scru-
tiny" test.""6 The Lutheran Church Missouri
Synod ("Lutheran Church") appealed the FCC's
decision, which argued the church violated Equal
Employment Opportunity ("EEO") regulations
through the use of the church's religious hiring
preferences and inadequate recruitment of mi-
norities.1 0 7 The court struck down the FCC's EEO
broadcast licensing standards on the basis that
they were not narrowly tailored and did not meet
a compelling governmental interest. 0 8
Although both Adarand and Lutheran Church
overturned the analysis upheld in Metro Broadcast-
ing, neither of these cases preclude the FCC from
promoting diversity of broadcasting or diversity of
ownership.' 0 9 In fact, the Court in Adarand over-
turned Metro Broadcasting only "to the extent it is
inconsistent with [their own] holding."'10 In
other words, if the Court in Metro Broadcasting had
applied the strict scrutiny standard, the Commis-
sion's minority preference policies would still be
good law.
The Court in Adarand and Lutheran Church
backed away from the public policy arguments of
promoting diversity in the broadcast industry.
However, the Court stated in Adarand that its deci-
sion was not meant to "diminish that aspect of
[its] decision in Metro Broadcasting."'I The circuit
court in Lutheran Church limited its holding to em-
ployment practices, not ownership.' 12 Further-
more, the court stated that the "recognition of [a]
government interest in 'diverse' programming
has not been disturbed by the [Supreme] Court,"
thus binding the circuit court to this Supreme
Court precedent. I I3
The FCC has acted further on this judicial gui-
dance by promulgating a new broadcast EEO li-
Id. at 235.
105 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
106 See id. at 354.
107 See id. at 356.
108 See id. at 354, 356.
109 Consequently, Metro Broad. was only overturned in
the level of analysis applied to the decision. Where the Court
noted in Metro Broad. that "enhancing broadcast diversity is,
at the very least, an important governmental interest," is still
good law. Metro. Broad., 497 U.S. at 567-68.
1' Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
111 Id. at 258 (referring to the proposition that fostering
diversity may "provide sufficient interest to justify such a pro-
gram" and that their decision is not inconsistent with this
proposition).
112 See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 355-56.
113 Id.
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censing standard. 114 The new licensing standard
re-establishes the Commission's authority to re-
tain the anti-discrimination provisions of its previ-
ous broadcast EEO rule. 1 5 This new rule empha-
sizes that broadcasters are not merely to refrain
from discriminating, but rather they are required
to "reach out" in recruiting new employees "be-
yond the confines of their circle of business."1 16
Additionally, the EEO Order states that persons
who discriminate "do not have the basic character
qualifications to hold a valuable government li-
cense."' 1 7 This action clearly states the impor-
tance the FCC places on diversity. When viewed in
conjunction with other FCC statements, it demon-
strates a greater FCC emphasis on promotion of
diverse viewpoints and encouragement of minor-
ity economic opportunities.
The FCC maintains a compelling interest in
promoting diversity within the broadcast industry.
None of these decisions preclude the FCC from
promoting policies that favor diversity. In fact, the
cases seem to support the positions taken by the
Commission. Current and future FCC policy
should continue to further the public interest of
nondiscriminatory decision-making in the broad-
cast media.
IV. THE MARKET DIFFERENTIAL: BECAUSE
OF THE SPECIAL NATURE OF
BROADCAST MEDIA AND THE
IRRATIONAL AFFECTS OF
DISCRIMINATION, GOVERNMENTAL
INTERVENTION IS PREFERENTIAL TO
NORMAL MARKET INCENTIVES TO
ENSURE THE DIVERSITY AND QUALITY
OF BROADCAST
114 See generally EEO Order, supra note 54.
115 See id.
116 Id. at para. 3.
117 Id. at para. 2.
118 See Andrea Adelson, Minority Voice Fading for Broadcast
Owners, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at D9; Matthew S. Scott,
Can Black Radio Survive an Industry Shakeout?, BLACK. ENTER-
PRISE, June 1993, at 254 [hereinafter Scott].
119 See Scott, supra note 118, at 254.
120 See Timothy Aeppel, Westinghouse to Buy American Ra-
dio, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1997, at A] (announcing Westing-
house's purchase of American Radio Systems, adding ninety-
eight radio stations to their portfolio); Eben Shapiro, Golden
Oldie: A Wave of Buyouts Has Radio Industry Beaming With Suc-
cess, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 1997, at Al (noting that since Con-
gress began deregulating the radio industry, it has become
one of the hottest markets in media). See also Gloria Tristani,
Keeping the Local in Radio, Remarks Before the Texas Broad-
A. Favoring Regulation over Market Solutions
to Prevent Discrimination
There is a fine line to walk with all regulation-
whether and how much government interference
should be required must be balanced. against the
ability of markets to self-regulate. The govern-
ment must decide whether to impose regulation
or allow the media market to determine certain
outcomes. Likewise, the government must deter-
mine whether specific requirements imposed
upon broadcasters are more effective and effi-
cient than general guidelines.
Many minority-owned and -formatted broad-
casters attribute their difficulties competing with
popular format stations to government efforts to
deregulate, claiming that the deregulation in-,
tended to help the market actually hinders minor-
ity broadcasters. II These broadcasters argue that
efforts to allow the market to determine certain
outcomes have made the practice of advertising
discrimination more visible by taking away certain
market-imposed incentives given to minority
licensees that previously evened out the playing
field. 19 Two specific actions are the consolidation
changes imposed by the 1996 Act and the elimina-
tion of the minority tax credit. 20 Both programs
once counterbalanced the effects of advertising
discrimination. In their absence, minority broad-
cast stations find it more difficult to compete. 121
In 1993, FCC Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett
perceived the potential adverse effects that pro-
consolidation would have on minority broadcast-
ers. 122 He strongly opposed an FCC strategy to al-
low broadcast industry consolidation.123 The con-
solidation effort was the FCC's strategy to help the
radio industry recoup the large chunk of advertis-
casters Association (Sept. 3, 1998) <www.fcc.gov/speeches/
tristani/spgt8l1.html> (observing that despite a national in-
crease of 4% in the number of stations, the number of radio
station owners has decreased by 12% over the past two years;
the radio industry also has lost an average of three owners in
each of the top ten radio markets and about one owner in
each smaller market); Allen S. Hammond, Measuring the
Nexus: The Relationship Between Minority Ownership and Broad-
cast Diversity After Metro Broad., 51 FED. COMM. L. J. 627, 631
(1999) [hereinfater Hammond].
121 See Hammond, supra note 120, at 631-632.
122 See National and Local Radio Ownership Rules and
FCC's Time Brokerage Rules Modified, News, MM Dkt. No.
91-140, Rpt No. DC-2073 (rel. Mar. 12, 1992) (Comm'r Bar-
rett's Dissenting Statement) [hereinafter Comm'r Barrett's
Dissent].
123 See id.
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ing dollars it was losing to cable and network tele-
vision. Simply put, the order allowed duopoly
ownership 124 and Local Marketing Agreements
("LMAs"). 125 Although a majority of the Commis-
sion believed consolidation would help the indus-
try, Commissioner Barrett dissented, arguing that
consolidation would hurt black station owners.1 26
He explained that the new regulations en-
couraged the establishment of regional pockets of
radio ownership by a larger company. 12 7 The re-
gional networks were attractive to advertisers, thus
having a negative impact on singly owned, minor-
ity-formatted radio stations. "Consolidation," he
said, "makes small independent [minority-format-
ted] stations harder to sell to advertisers."'128
The dissent in Metro Broadcasting argued that
the market controls expression even if a broad-
caster might prefer to program differently. 29 This
argument implies that the market will determine
what broadcasters air; if there is not a market for
something, the broadcasters will not air it. This ar-
gument is faulty due to the special nature of the
sale of media. Although there may be an audience
for the media, that audience does not directly
support the livelihood of the media. In fact, there
may not be enough advertising dollars to support
the media due to discriminatory practices that dis-
rupt natural market forces. Consequently, even if
there is an audience, the station might not survive
due to the lack of advertising dollars. If no adver-
tiser exists, the station, for market reasons, will
not survive.
A number of market applications affect the abil-
ity of minorities to compete in the broadcast
124 Duopoly ownership is when one company owns up to
two AM and two FM stations in the same market. See id.
125 Local Marketing Agreements ("LMAs") permit a ra-
dio or television licensee to "lease" its station to others, which
is often another licensee. Because the party leasing the sta-
tion is not considered a "licensee," the leasing of the new
station does not count against them with regard to attribu-
tion rates. See Gigi B. Sohn & Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Spe-
cial Issue On The Sixtieth Anniversary of the Communications Act of
1934: Essay: Broadcast Licensees and Localism: At Home in the
"Communications Revolution, "47 Fi.n. COMM. L. J. 383 (1994).
126 See Comm'r Barrett's Dissent, supra note 122. See also
Scott, supra note 118, at 254.
127 See Scott, supra note 118, at 254.
128 Comm'r Barrett's Dissent, supra note 122.
129 See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (referring to the FCC's focus on ownership being a
nexus to programming: "the market shapes programming to
a tremendous extent. Members of minority groups who own
licenses might be thought, like other owners, to seek broad-
cast programs that will attract and retain audiences").
field. 30 Deregulatory policies, the relaxation of
multiple ownership and duopoly rules, the elimi-
nation of federal tax credits favoring minority
owners, as well as the creation of LMAs all affect
the ability of minority and majority broadcasters
to compete. 31 Referring to the deregulation of
the 1996 Act, Debra Lee, President and Chief Op-
erating Officer of BET Holdings, stated that pol-
icy-makers are misguided in their belief that "true
diversity" will come from more competition in the
broadcast market. 132 Lee contends that the buy-
ing power of minority broadcast stations is "dwin-
dling without the edge that the tax credit gave
them."1 33 The "edge" Lee referred to is the mar-
ket balancing affect of the tax credit given to mi-
nority-owned stations. This credit reduced the af-
fects of discriminatory advertising practices by
giving minority-owned stations a tax credit.
B. Government Regulation Critique-Too
Paternalistic
Economically minded critics of government in-
tervention in the broadcast industry argue that in-
terventions are paternalistic and industry is able
to resolve problems on its own.' 34 Setting the tone
for deregulation, former FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler explained that the government should rely
on "normal mechanisms of the marketplace" to
decide what the media broadcast.13 5 Fowler claims
that media is no different from any other product,
and that in the deregulated marketplace "the
highest bidder would make the best and highest
1 0 See Hammond, supra note 120, at 631.
131 See id. at 632. See also Gloria Tristani, Keeping the Local
in Radio, Remarks Before the Texas Broadcasters Association
(Sept. 3, 1998) <www.fcc.gov/speeches/tristani/spgt8 11.
html>.
132 See Matt Pottinger, BET President Says Telecom Act Dam-
aging Minority Ownership Prospects, ST. NEWS Svc., Jan. 16,
1997.
133 Id. It is important to note that minority-owned sta-
tions have a very high correlation with minority-formatted ra-
dio stations. Thus the market barriers presented to minority
ownership interests have an impact on the broadcast of mi-
nority formats. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 555-56 (uphold-
ing the FCC's finding that minority preferences werejustified
as a means of increasing diversity of broadcast viewpoint).
134 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Con-
verging First Amendment Principles for Converging Communica-
tions Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1725 (1995).
135 Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207, 210
(1982).
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use of the resource."'136
In 1984, the Commission issued an order where
it determined that market incentives ensured
broadcast programming was responsive to com-
munity needs.' 3 7 The Program Order stated that
market forces "provide sufficient incentives for
licensees to become and remain aware of the
needs and problems of their communities.' ' 3 8 In
this action, the Commission "deregulated" the
programming requirements of broadcasters that
previously limited them to no more than twelve
commercial announcements per hour.1 39 In that
same order, however, the Commission retained
the right to review these policies, 40 thereby not
relinquishing their authority, but recognizing the
opportunity for market influences to affect the
broadcasters' programming decisions. By retain-
ing their right to review, the Commission asserted
their ability to review programming of broadcast-
ers and the market influences on that program-
ming in the future.
This deregulatory tone has carried over into
much of the policy-making forums that affect the
regulation of broadcasting. The 1996 Act was
adopted as "an Act to promote competition and
reduce regulation."'14 ' This pro-market refrain
might also receive support from those generally
pro-regulatory liberals because of First Amend-
ment concerns that reject government paternal-
ism with regard to freedom of speech.' 42 The First
Amendment, however, restricts the intentional
suppression of speech; market interventions de-
signed to improve the quality and diversity of the
press are not restricted by the First Amendment.
Rather, First Amendment principles support the
Commission's authority surrounding the diversity
136 Id. at 211. See Baker, supra note 74, at 313.
137 See generally In Re The Revision of Programming and
Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements,
and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television
Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Program Orderl].
'-' d. at para. 2.
139 See id. (citing to Amendments to Delegation of Au-
thority, Order, 43 F.C.C.2d 638, 640 (1973); Amendments to
Delegations of Authority, Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 493
(1976)).
141o See id. at para. 3 n.2 (stating that these programming
obligations are properly subject to review and revision in the
future).
14" The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Introductory De-
scriptive Statement, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
142 See Baker, supra note 74, at 314.
of broadcast. 4 3
The standard model of economics is somewhat
oversimplified when applied to broadcast in the
United States. 14 4 Under general economic theory,
the market produces a "preference-maximizing"
amount of the product. 4 5 The demand for the
product drives production as long as the con-
sumer is willing to pay more than the product's
cost (cost of production), that is, as long as the
marginal price exceeds the marginal cost. 146 Even
if this is true with respect to can openers and gro-
ceries, this theory is not applicable to the sale of
media or any other consumer good where
prejudice and bias replace rational market fac-
tors. 
147
Unlike can openers and groceries, radio broad-
casts have a "public good" aspect, in that the use
of the product by one individual does not necessa-
rily affect the use of the product by another. 48
Thus, the marginal cost is difficult to determine
when there exists a "consumer" who does not pay
for the product. Secondly, the extent of externali-
ties (costs imposed on the seller/purchaser that
are not accounted for in the purchase price) are
significant in broadcast media. Broadcasts can ad-
vance or ruin reputations, determine the amount
of news one knows or rouse an angry mob. Simi-
larly, many people value a well-functioning de-
mocracy and hence are greatly benefited by other
people's consumption of quality, diverse media;
these same people are harmed by ignorance and
apathy produced by misleading, inadequate or
nondiverse media. Finally, media products are dif-
ferent than most consumer products because two
purchasers pay for the transaction; broadcasters
sell audiences to advertisers and advertisers sell
143 The First Amendment, in fact, preserves diverse view-
points. See Statement Policy on Minority Ownership, Public
Notice, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 981 (1978) [hereinafter Minority
Ownership Policy].
144 See Baker, supra note 74 at 315. (explaining why the
"Standard Model" is an inaccurate depiction of the media
market, and ultimately why regulatory oversight maintains
the integrity of the public airwaves).
145 See id.
146 See id. (stating that the "Standard Model" is based on
the following premises: 1) that products are sold in competi-
tive markets; 2) that production and normal use produces
few externalities (i.e., few major benefits not captured by or
costs not imposed on the seller/producer); and 3) that the
most significant policy concern is satisfying market-expressed
preferences).
147 See id.
148 See id.
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products to audiences. 149 With these multiple pur-
chasers comes the potential for conflicting inter-
ests in media content. 150 In situations where mar-
ket-pricing mechanisms cannot be relied upon for
efficiency or equity, the government should inter-
vene.
15 1
V. OFFERING A SOLUTION
THE COMMISSION SHOULD ACT ON ITS AU-
THORITY BY REVISITING THE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS LAID OUT BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS
FORUM AND HOLDING BROADCASTERS RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR NOT ENGAGING IN BUSI-
NESS WITH DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISERS.
A. Revisiting the Recommendations of the
Minority Broadcast Advertising Study
The Civil Rights Forum ("CRF") made several
recommendations to the Commission when they
issued their report on advertising discrimination
last year. 152 Among the recommendations, CRF
suggested that the Commission conduct further
research to evaluate advertising business practices
in order to more narrowly define those business
practices that may not be justifiable in terms of
nondiscriminatory marketing objectives. 15 3 Fur-
ther research is appropriate to determine whether
advertising discrimination is an issue within the
television broadcast markets as well. 154 The CRF
also recommended that the FCC take the lead, in-
itiating a joint task force with the Federal Trade
Commission for the purpose of adopting a policy
statement on acceptable advertising practices. 155
At this time, however, the Commission has ne-
149 See id. at 320 (citing to his other works on this topic:
C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PREss ch. 2
(1994)).
150 See id.
151 See Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spec-
trum Utilization and Allocation, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
505, 518 n.34 (1969).
152 See The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, supra note
2, at 18-21.
153 See id. at 18.
154 See id. (noting that the data with regard to television
advertisements was inconclusive due to the special nature of
television, and the fact that 1) television programming is not
targeted through the course of a day the same way radio is
(with the large exception of Spanish-language television);
and 2) a large representation of black owned stations were
Home Shopping Network affiliates, which ran advertisements
24 hours a day).
155 See id. at 19.
156 See id. at 19-20.
157 This concept of bona fide product exemption is ex-
glected to take the recommended action. The ef-
fects of advertising discrimination have an over-
whelming influence on the FCC's role of
promoting diverse broadcasting. A code of con-
duct should be established to require that adver-
tising purchasing decisions are based upon mar-
ket research and not by flawed stereotypical
buying assumptions. 156 "No Urban/Spanish dic-
tates" and "minority discounts" should be strictly
prohibited without a bona fide product exemp-
tion. 157
Broadcasters should be required to disclose
whether their market research used in coordina-
tion with sales promotion has been prepared by a
service that is accredited by the Media Rating
Council ("MRC"). 158 Where nonaccredited mar-
ket research services are used, the broadcasters
should be required by the FCC to show cause why
they do not use an accredited service. Minor varia-
tions in market research can cause significant dif-
ferences in market research results. A practice
known as audience "undercounting" is an effect
that the study suggests may account for some of
the discriminatory actions. Here, minority audi-
ences are either not totaled or accounted for cor-
rectly. 159 The concept is that an industry standard,
whereby participants can decide what those indus-
try standards are, will help put all broadcasters
and advertising organizations on an even playing
field and eliminate potentially conflicting data.
Finally, the FCC should initiate an executive or-
der that prohibits federal agencies from con-
tracting with advertising agencies that practice
discriminatory advertising actions 160 or that other-
plained further below, but note that it serves as a rebuttable
presumption and exempts an advertiser of the requirement if
it can prove that the product should be exempted because of
the nature of the product and the demographics of that
group.
158 MRC is a nonprofit media industry association with
the purpose of maintaining audience research confidence
and credibility. They serve to ensure that audience measure-
ment services are valid, reliable and effective. By reviewing all
methodological aspects of the organization's service, MRC
evaluates audience research to ensure that it is accurate. All
MRC organizations are audited regularly and expected to
contribute to the improvement of research quality in the
marketplace. See Media Rating Council, Inc., Organizational
By-Laws, Mission Statement and Information Paper (Feb. 24,
2000) (unpublished, on file with Media Rating Council,
Inc.). See also The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, supra
note 2, at iv.
159 See The Minority Broadcast Advertising Study, supra note
2, at 19.
160 This would be similar to that imposed on broadcast
[Vol. 8
Protecting Minority Broadcasters
wise fail to comply with the policy statement of
the joint task force. This policy should follow the
code of conduct outlined for industry, requiring
that neither the federal government nor a con-
tracting agent for the federal government engage
in any business with discriminatory advertising
agencies. 1
B. Broadcast Licensing Qualification
The Commission has served to ensure diversity
of ownership in broadcasting. The problem of dis-
crimination arises once minority broadcasters
compete for advertising dollars and are faced with
a discriminatory marketplace. If a minority broad-
cast station cannot maintain adequate sponsor-
ship, it will not be able to expand and develop; it
will not be able to afford to hire the industry's
best and brightest; and it ultimately will not be
able to compete with other broadcasters on an
equal footing. 162
The Commission has a mandate from Congress
to ensure the diversity of the airwaves.' 63 They
have conducted studies, held forums and en-
couraged the industry to eliminate the problem
on their own. The Commission has recognized
this issue for more than twenty years when it ob-
served that the views of minorities were under-
represented in broadcast media. 64 The Commis-
sion's interest in this matter is evident. Delay in
the further development of FCC policy will un-
doubtedly result in the intensification of the prob-
lem. The Commission must seek to eliminate ad-
vertising discrimination. This comment proposes
that the Commission only license those broadcast-
licensees. See id. at 19-20.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 22 (citing telephone interview with Tom Cas-
tro, Chairman and President of El Dorado Communications,
where he states the frustration of minority broadcast stations
trying to compete with larger stations:
(1) [b]ecause of the discounts, sometimes you can't
compete and keep your best people. And that leads to a
• . . drain. We do the hard work of training them, and
then they go off and work for these larger companies
. . .; (2) Our profits are less. If our profits are fewer,
then when it comes time to buy the station that comes
up for sale in a given city where we are competing [with
larger stations], they're going to be able to outbid us for
those properties because of the profits that they have
built up over time. And so that means they have yet an-
other scarce frequency that they control, and we are los-
ing the opportunity to build wealth for ourselves. (3)
The quality of our programming, while good, would be
better if we had more profits. If we had more profits we
ers who affirm that they do not engage in any bus-
iness with advertisers who participate in discrimi-
natory practices.
Such action will ensure that all broadcasters po-
lice the marketplace. With the status of their ap-
plications pending, broadcasters have a great deal
to lose if found conducting business with discrimi-
natory advertisers. This then becomes a qualifica-
tion factor for broadcasters when applying for, or
seeking renewal of, broadcast licenses.
With this new policy, advertisers will have much
more to lose by practicing discriminatory advertis-
ing. If they are found to be discriminating, they
will not be able to advertise through broadcast
media until they remedy their discriminatory ad-
vertising practices or provide an affirmative de-
fense for their actions. Broadcasters will require
advertisers to sign a statement that they do not
and will not engage in discriminatory advertising
practices. If broadcasters have reason to believe
that an advertiser whom they engage in business
with is practicing discriminatory advertising, in or-
der to protect their license, they will either re-
quire the advertiser to remedy their actions or ex-
tinguish business with the advertiser altogether.
Advertisers should, however, be allowed a bona
fide product qualification (similar to bona fide oc-
cupational qualification) as an affirmative defense
to any allegations of discriminatory marketing
practices. 165 For example, bronzing lotion manu-
facturers will not be required to advertise their
products on minority-formatted media. Similarly,
the producers of black hair care products should
not be required to advertise on popular-formatted
could invest that back into our business. So, it's harder
to remain competitive, and it's harder to promote your
format to the public . . . It's a vicious cycle.
Id.
163 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 309.
164 See Minority Ownership Policy, supra note 143 (stating
that although efforts have been made to correct the
problems of diversity in broadcasting, "[W]e are compelled
to observe that the views of racial minorities continue to be
inadequately represented in the broadcast media").
165 In the area of Title VII law known as "bona fide occu-
pational qualification" ("BFOQ"), in which certain forms of
overt discrimination based on sex or national origin can be
justified, the Court has held that the test is whether the pro-
posed BFOQ relates "to the 'essence' . .. or to the 'central
mission of the employer's business.'" International Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991) (quoting
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); Western Air-
lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)).
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radio stations if their product is aimed directly to-
ward certain population segments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Out of concern for a lively democracy and the
spirit of a marketplace of free ideas, the Commis-
sion must preserve the diversity of radio airwaves
and the communities implicit within that diver-
sity.
The issues discussed in this comment ultimately
affect the quality of programming made available
to the listening public. To the extent advertising
practices affect competition, broadcasters are less
capable of providing a diverse range of viewpoints
and a plethora of high quality programming
choices. Congress, the courts 166 and the FCC16 7
have each repeatedly expressed concern that di-
versity of viewpoints must be reflected in the
broadcast media. Indeed the Commission's study
was based on congressional policy "favoring diver-
sity of media voices [and] vigorous economic
competition."16 8
The Commission has pursued numerous initia-
tives in an attempt to diversify public broadcasting
and enhance media quality. Indeed, the Commis-
sion identified "diversification of control of the
media of mass communications" as "a factor of
primary significance" in its competitive licensing
processes, and has adopted diversity and minority
"preferences" in other selection processes. 169 The
Commission has also adopted equal opportunity
rules designed to foster opportunities for minori-
ties and women in the broadcast field. These
Commission initiatives are designed to promote
diversity of participation in the broadcast field.
116i See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1943) ("[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public."). See also Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 568. In Metro
Broad., the Court commented, "diversity of views and infor-
mation on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
values... The benefits of such diversity are not limited to the
members of minority groups who gain access to the broad-
casting industry by virtue of the ownership policies; rather,
the benefits rebound to all members of the viewing and lis-
tening audience."Id.
167 See Minority Ornership Policy, supra note 143 ("Ade-
quate representation of minority viewpoints in programming
serves not only the needs and interests of the minority coin-
munity but also enriches and educates the non-minority audi-
ence.").
168 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996), 47 U.S.C. § 257(a), (b) ("identi-
The Commission holds that diversity of ownership
and employment in the broadcast industry will
promote diversity of broadcast material. 70
U.S. citizens deserve access to diverse opinions
and public affairs information that directly affect
their communities and families. It is not the right
of advertisers to choose what voice is to be heard.
The FCC therefore must ensure that all voices
have an equal right to be heard.
Current government inaction may be a result of
the inability to develop a comprehensive plan that
will eliminate the problem entirely. In fact, there
may be no way to completely eradicate something
that is as arbitrary as racial discrimination. The ac-
tions recommended by this paper, however,
should significantly reduce the impact of discrimi-
nation in the broadcast industry by increasing the
standard that advertisers and broadcasters are ex-
pected to uphold. If an advertiser continues to
practice discriminatory behavior after the imple-
mentation of Commission discrimination policies,
this will be a significant detriment to the adver-
tiser as well as those broadcasters who choose to
engage in business with that advertiser.
Advertisers should not be commanded to
purchase airtime on less qualified radio stations
simply because of the minority broadcast popula-
tions. Far from disparaging real qualifications to
advertise products, advertisers should be required
to select media with real qualifications serving as
controlling factors, so that race becomes irrele-
vant. By ensuring that advertisers base their mar-
keting decisions on real marketing qualifications,
the Commission will thereby serve to ensure that
the diversity of voices in media is heard. Chair-
fying and eliminating.., market barriers ... the Commission
shall seek to promote the policies of this Act favoring diver-
sity of media voices, vigorous economic competition, techno-
logical advancement, and promotion of the public interest,
convenience and necessity").
,9 In Re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Com-
munications Act-Competitive Bidding, Report and Orde; 11
FCC Rcd. 19,341 (1996) (explaining the Commission's rea-
soning for actions on both accounts).
171) See In Re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and
3.638 of the Rules and Regulations Relating to the Multiple
Ownership of AM FM and Television Broadcasting Stations,
Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, at 292-93 (1953) (stating that
the fundamental purpose of its new national ownership rules
was "to promote diversification of ownership in order to max-
imize diversification of program and service viewpoints as
well as to prevent any undue concentration of economic
power contrary to the public interest").
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man Kennard and Commissioner Tristani re-
cently commented:
[T]he issue is whether we will ensure that the mass me-
dia reflect all of society for the benefit of all of society.
We believe that these principles are the bedrock of our
democratic system of government and our way of life as
a free and inclusive society.
1 7 1
171 In Re Review of the Commission's Broadcast and
Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies
and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 23,004 (1998) Uoint
The efforts to eliminate advertising discrimina-
tion will ensure that diversity of programming
prospers. The Commission has determined that
discrimination exists. Now it should act on that
knowledge.
Statement of William E. Kennard & Gloria Tristani) (relating
to the context of EEO requirements intended to promote
programming diversity).
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